This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the (...) latter exists while arguing that the fonner doesn't . Section I makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making, The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude. (shrink)

Plato is associated with the idea that the body holds us back from knowing ultimate reality and so we should try to distance ourselves from its influence. This sentiment appears is several of his dialogues including Theaetetus where the flight from the physical world is compared to becoming like God. In some major dialogues of Plato's later career such as Philebus and Laws, however, the idea of becoming like God takes a different turn. God is an intelligent force that tries (...) to create order in the physical world. I argue that likeness to God in these dialogues involves imitating God's effort by trying to order our bodies, souls, and societies as intelligence directs. Becoming like Plato's God is not to abandon the world. It is to improve it. (shrink)

This new, inexpensive translation of Plato's Apology of Socrates is an alternative to the 19th-century Jowett translation that students find online when they're trying to save money on books. Using the 1995 Oxford Classical Text and the commentaries of John Burnet and James Helm, I aimed to produce a 21st-century English translation that is both true to Plato's Greek and understandable to college students in introductory philosophy, political theory, and humanities courses. The book also includes a new translation of the (...) death scene from Plato's Phaedo, a short introduction, a dozen explanatory notes, advice on how to cite Plato in papers, and suggestions for further reading. Search for "Plato Armstrong" in Apple Books (epub ISBN 9781957448022) and Amazon (paperback ISBN 9781957448008, Kindle ISBN 9781957448015). (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to formalize long-term trajectories of human civilization as a scientific and ethical field of study. The long-term trajectory of human civilization can be defined as the path that human civilization takes during the entire future time period in which human civilization could continue to exist. -/- Design/methodology/approach This paper focuses on four types of trajectories: status quo trajectories, in which human civilization persists in a state broadly similar to its current state into the distant future; catastrophe (...) trajectories, in which one or more events cause significant harm to human civilization; technological transformation trajectories, in which radical technological breakthroughs put human civilization on a fundamentally different course; and astronomical trajectories, in which human civilization expands beyond its home planet and into the accessible portions of the cosmos. -/- Findings Status quo trajectories appear unlikely to persist into the distant future, especially in light of long-term astronomical processes. Several catastrophe, technological transformation and astronomical trajectories appear possible. -/- Originality/value Some current actions may be able to affect the long-term trajectory. Whether these actions should be pursued depends on a mix of empirical and ethical factors. For some ethical frameworks, these actions may be especially important to pursue. (shrink)

For students and the general reader, this is the best English translation of the entire 'Laws' available. I give several examples of important lines that are translated well in this edition, but I take issue with the translation of some other lines and with part of Schofield's introduction on grounds that these parts do not reveal Plato's political and cosmic holism as clearly as they could have.

David Armstrong (1926-2014) was much the most internationally successful philosopher to come from Sydney. His life moved from a privileged Empire childhood and student of John Anderson to acclaimed elder statesman of realist philosophy. His philosophy developed from an Andersonian realist inheritance to major contributions on materialist theory of mind and the theory of universals. His views on several other topics such as religion and ethics are surveyed briefly.

A letter to The Times of London, May 9, 1992 protesting the Cambridge University proposal to award an honorary degree to M. Jacques Derrida.

Identification of factors that predict recurrent antisocial behavior is integral to the social sciences, criminal justice procedures, and the effective treatment of high-risk individuals. Here we show that error-related brain activity elicited during performance of an in- hibitory task prospectively predicted subsequent rearrest among adult offenders within 4 y of release (N =96). The odds that an offender with relatively low anterior cingulate activity would be rearrested were approximately double that of an offender with high activity in this region, holding (...) constant other observed risk factors. These results suggest a potential neurocognitive biomarker for persistent antisocial behavior. (shrink)

The “film as philosophy” (FAP) hypothesis turned into a field if its own right during the 2000s, after S. Mulhall’s On Film (2001). In this work, Mulhall defended that some films philosophize for themselves. This caused controversy. Around the same time of On Film’s release, B. Russell published the article “The philosophical limits of film” (2000). This article had one of the first attacks against FAP, posing some main objections based on metaphilosophical grounds, which were called the “generality” and the (...) “explicitness” objections. These objections made by Russell and by M. Smith are based on the idea that film and philosophy are too different in their purposes or ways of presentation, ideas that are grounded in implicit or explicit conceptions of philosophy. In this chapter, these will be analyzed, as well as some other metaphilosophically grounded objections, as a line of reasoning connecting to attempts of responding to them will be drawn. After doing so, it will be concluded that their metaphilosophical grounds are implausible, and, thus, they are not definite objections against FAP. (shrink)

We explicate and evaluate arguments both for and against the insanity defense itself, different versions of the insanity defense (M'Naghten, Model Penal Code, and Durham (or Product)), the Irresistible Impulse rule, and various reform proposals.

In this study, we conceptualized a framework capturing recurring troublesome elements of mental states such as depression and general anxiety, assessing them by applying standard clinical inventory. The study explores the extent to which danger control and fear control under the Extended Parallel Processing Model (EPPM) threat impact job insecurity, with uncertainty phenomenon causing afflicting effect on the experiential nature of depression heightened by anxiety. With the aim to explore the job insecurity relationship with anxiety and depression, and measure the (...) impact of EPPM threat, an empirical study was conducted in the United States on a sample of 347 white collar employees. Demographic data, EPPM threat, job insecurity, anxiety, and depression data were collected via a standardized questionnaire during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The findings of the study suggest that job insecurity has a significant impact on depression and anxiety, whereas the threat of COVID-19 has a significant impact on depression. Mediating effects of job insecurity and EPPM threat impact on anxiety were not established in the study. The study contributes to the apprehension of the repercussions of major environmental disruptions on normal human functioning, and it investigates the effects of self-reported protective behaviors on risk perception. The study also explains the underlying mechanisms of coping behavior as possible antecedents to mental disorders. When subjected to stressful events, heightened psychological arousal causes physical and psychological challenges of affected employees to manifest as behavioral issues. (shrink)

A review of *The Social Origins of Language* by Robert M. Seyfarth and Dorothy L. Cheney; edited and introduced by Michael L. Platt.

People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative than those in which (...) other people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore, people judge those actions that happened further in the past to be more morally wrong than those that happened more recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they believed that they were very different people than they are now, participants judge their actions to be more morally wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of their pasts when they believed that they were very similar to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in relation to theories about the function of autobiographical memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving the self over time. (shrink)

The problem of time has been present throughout history of philosophy since its beginnings. However to consider what is time is not a matter of technical theorization, conversely, this results interesting in as much as a reflection on the nature of world, and even the human particularities, cannot evade time problem. Aristotle is a stage under obligation in history of philosophy. My main purpose is to understand why time is problematic and what difficulties we have to meet with (chapter one). (...) On the other hand, I'm interested in the way Aristotle give an account of these difficulties in virtue of the relation among movement or change, magnitude and time, as well as the latter character of number (chapters two and three). Finally, is necessary to present some subsequent problems related with the time theory at stake (chapter four). (shrink)

Book review of David Armstrong's "Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics", written in Spanish. || Reseña del libro "Sketch for a Sytematic Metaphysics", escrito por David Armstrong.

Armstrong has loose identity be an equivalence relation, yet in cases of something becoming something else, loose identity is not transitive. My alternate account has an attribution of loose identity be really two: a true attribution of an underlying relation (perhaps not transitive) and a false attribution--a Humean feigning-of strict identity. The feigning may become less appropriate as the underlying relation grows more distant. What makes it appropriate initially is that the underlying relation supports a predictable change in some (...) collective. The importance of the predictably changing collective is signaled by regarding it as a single thing. (shrink)

This is a review (in French) of the French translation and edition of D.M. Armstrong's Universals: An Opiniated Introduction.

Oliver's and Rodriguez-Pereyra's important interpretation of the problem of universals as one concerning truthmakers neglects something crucial: that there is a numerical identity between numerically distinct particulars. The problem of universals is rather how to resolve the apparent contradiction that the same things are both numerically distinct and numerically identical. Baxter's account of instantiation as partial identity resolves the apparent contradiction. A seeming objection to this account is that it appears to make instantiation symmetric, since partial identity is symmetric. (...) class='Hi'>Armstrong's standard reply is that the difference between a particular and a universal is what makes instantiation asymmetric. Brown suggests, though, that the instantiation of a universal by a universal is sometimes symmetric. However, the examples on which he relies are not universals. (shrink)

D. M. Armstrong famously claims that deterministic laws of nature are contingent relations between universals and that his account can also be straightforwardly extended to irreducibly probabilistic laws of nature. For the most part, philosophers have neglected to scrutinize Armstrong’s account of probabilistic laws. This is surprising precisely because his own claims about probabilistic laws make it unclear just what he takes them to be. We offer three interpretations of what Armstrong-style probabilistic laws are, and argue that (...) all three interpretations are incompatible either with some feature of Armstrong’s broader metaphysics or with essential features of his account of laws (or both). (shrink)

One of the advantages of my account in the essay “Instantiation as Partial Identity” was capturing the contingency of instantiation—something David Armstrong gave up in his experiment with a similar view. What made the contingency possible for me was my own non-standard account of identity, complete with the apparatus of counts and aspects. The need remains to lift some obscurity from the account in order to display its virtues to greater advantage. To that end, I propose to respond to (...) those who have grappled with it in print. There are various criticisms by commentators: that it is rendered absurd by the transitivity of identity, that it makes instantiation necessary instead of contingent, that it is unclear what counts are, that aspects are simply tropes, that my view does not capture multiple location, that I make an unclear reference to a theory of composition as identity, that the account suffers from problems with polyadicity, and that it is not a realist account of universals after all. I give responses to these objections. (shrink)

D. M. Armstrong rejects various ontologies that posit truths without truthmakers. But, lest proponents of such questionable ontologies postulate suspicious truthmakers in a bid to regain ontological respectability, Armstrong requires a plausible restriction on truthmaking that eliminates such ontologies. I discuss three different candidate restrictions: categorical, natural, and intrinsic difference-making. While the categorical and natural restrictions eliminate the questionable ontologies, they also eliminate Armstrong’s own ontology. The intrinsic difference-making restriction, on the other hand, fails to eliminate any (...) of them. Thus Armstrong lacks a principled reason for rejecting such ontologies. (shrink)

Construing the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of my theory of aspects resolves the basic mystery of this "non-relational tie", and gives theoretical unity to the four characteristics of instantiation discerned by Armstrong. Taking aspects as distinct in a way akin to Scotus's formal distinction, I suggest that instantiation is the sharing of an aspect by a universal and a particular--a kind of partial identity. This approach allows me to address Plato's multiple location and One (...) over Many problems, Bradley's problem concerning the instantiation of relations, and the problem of change. (shrink)

Abstract: In chapter 15 of A Materialist Theory of the Mind, D.M.Armstrong offers an account of what he calls “the biological value of introspection”, namely, that “without information…about the current state of our minds, purposive trains mental activity would be impossible.” This paper examines and assesses Armstrong’s “Just-so story about introspective consciousness”—as W.G.Lycan later called it. One moral will be that appreciating this aspect of Armstrong’s view blurs the difference between his own perceptual model of introspection, and (...) the anti-perceptual models advanced by such critics as Sydney Shoemaker . (shrink)

This thesis proposes that key, competing theories of dispositions mistake and conflate how we identify, designate and talk about dispositions and dispositional terms for the nature of dispositions and the meaning of dispositional terms when they argue that: a) dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers (Boyle 1666) b) all properties are purely dispositional (Bird 2007) c) all properties are purely categorical (there are no dispositional properties) (Armstrong in AMP 1996) d) dispositional and categorical properties are separate and distinct (...) properties (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982). In so doing these theories make unwarranted and unsupported ontological conclusions about dispositions. The thesis traces the principal source of this confusion and conflation to a reliance on the counterfactual analysis of dispositions that wrongly encourages the conflation of a disposition (say fragility) with its manifestation (shattering). There is good reason to hold that the counterfactual analysis of dispositions is false — the truth of a counterfactual statement (such as “if x were dropped x would break”) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a dispositional ascription (such as “x is fragile”). (shrink)

This chapter by Fisher continues the theme of the relation between Armstrong and Lewis, only Fisher casts the net far wider. He begins by arguing that there were at least two different lines of influence from early twentieth-century behaviourism to the identity theory: one through logical positivism and the other through ordinary language philosophy, the latter involving Place and Smart, and Lewis and Armstrong. It was Armstrong and Lewis who were to have a profound influence on subsequent (...) developments in analytic philosophy, both methodologically and in metaphysics, and it is for this reason that Fisher devotes the rest of his chapter to tracing the origins of their theories of mind and the manner in which the emphases and methodologies deployed in developing their respective theories became the hallmarks of their wider impact on analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Trope theory is the view that the world consists (wholly or partly) of particular qualities, or tropes. This admittedly thin core assumption leaves plenty of room for variation. Still, most trope theorists agree that their theory is best developed as a one-category theory according to which there is nothing but tropes. Most hold that ‘sameness of property’ should be explained in terms of resembling tropes. And most hold that concrete particulars are made up from tropes in compresence (for an overview, (...) including an introduction to some alternative versions of the view, cf. Maurin, 2014). D. M. Armstrong disagrees. He thinks the world is a world of immanent universals, the thin particulars in which those universals are instantiated, and the states of affairs that—thereby—exist. He holds that ‘sameness of property’ should be explained in terms of numerically identical universals or—if the resembling things are the universals themselves—in terms of partially identical universals. And he believes that concrete particulars are made up from ‘thin particulars’ in which a (sufficient) number of universals are instantiated. In spite of their disagreements, proponents of tropes owe Armstrong a debt of gratitude. First, for being one of the theory’s earliest, most serious, and—not least—most prominent, critics (Armstrong for the first time considers, and rejects, what he then labels ‘particularism’, in his 1978a). But also for being one of the theory’s most ardent champions. Already in his 1989a, Armstrong regrets his 1978-rejection of the view. Equivalence classes of exactly resembling tropes, he now admits, for most purposes “serve as an excellent substitute for universals” (Armstrong 1989a, 122). But then why isn’t Armstrong a trope theorist? In this paper, Armstrong’s main reasons for rejecting the trope view are critically scrutinized. All of them, it is maintained, fail to convince. If this argument is accepted, Armstrong seems to have no—or, at least, no good—reason for not accepting the existence of tropes. But, then, ought Armstrong to have been a trope theorist? If the ‘best’ version of the trope view turns out to be ontologically more parsimonious than Armstrong’s own theory of universals, then, yes. That there is a version of the trope view, a version that is not (or, at least not seriously) considered by Armstrong, that is ontologically more parsimonious than the universals view, is argued in the next section. Why none of Armstrong’s reasons for preferring universals to tropes manage to convince, is explained in the section after that. First, however, and in order to avoid a common misunderstanding of the trope view and, as a consequence, of why one ought to reject it, a few more words about the core-difference between tropes and universals, and about how this difference matters (as well as does not matter) to what—and how well—these theories explain. (shrink)

In the ontology of music the Aristotelian theory of musical works is the view that musical works are immanent universals. The Aristotelian theory (hereafter Musical Aristotelianism) is an attractive and serviceable hypothesis. However, it is overlooked as a genuine competitor to the more well-known theories of Musical Platonism and nominalism. Worse still, there is no detailed account in the literature of the nature of the universals that the Aristotelian identifies musical works with. In this paper, I argue that the best (...) version of Musical Aristotelianism identifies musical works with structural universals. I first motivate the view by outlining its explanatory benefits. I then argue that Musical Aristotelianism is preferable to Musical Platonism and present a novel account of musical works as structural universals by developing D. M. Armstrong’s theory of structural universals. I discuss the consequences of Musical Aristotelianism with respect to on-going issues in debates about musical works and defend the view against an influential objection, concluding that Musical Aristotelianism is a genuine competitor in debates about the nature of musical works. (shrink)

In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, mainly his pluriverse of (...) possible worlds and its many applications, that systematicity was due to the influence of his teacher Quine, who really was an heir to Russell. Drawing upon Lewis’s posthumous papers and his correspondence as well as the published record, we show that Lewis’s non- Quinean influences, including G.E. Moore and D.M. Armstrong, led Lewis to an anti- systematic methodology which leaves each philosopher’s views and starting points to his or her own personal conscience. (shrink)

Bird reveals an important problem at the heart of Armstrong’s theory of laws of nature: to explain how a law necessitates its corresponding regularity, Armstrong is committed to a vicious regress. In his very brief response, Armstrong gestures towards an argument that, as he admits, is more of a “speculation.” Later, Barker and Smart argue that a very similar problem threatens Bird’s dispositional monist theory of laws of nature and he is committed to a similar vicious regress. (...) In this paper, first, I construct Armstrong’s would-be argument in response to Bird. Second, I argue that his response makes his account of laws and natural properties incompatible with science. Finally, I argue that Armstrong’s strategy to address Bird’s criticism can be used, quite ironically, to defuse Barker and Smart’s argument against Bird. (shrink)

Some recent literature [Hicks, M. T. and van Elswyk. P., (2015) pp. 433-443, 2015; Bhogal, H. (2017), pp. 447-460] has argued that the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature have a same weakness as the Humean conceptions of laws of nature. That is, both conceptions face an explanatory circularity problem. The argument is as follows: the Humean and the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature agree that the law statements are universal generalisations; thus, both conceptions are vulnerable to an explanatory (...) circularity problem between the laws of nature and their instances. In this paper, I argue that Armstrong’s necessitarian view of laws of nature is invulnerable to this explanatory circularity problem. (shrink)

David Lewis is typically interpreted as a class nominalist. One consequence of class nominalism, which he embraced, is that the reduction of ordered pairs, triples, etc to unordered sets of sets is conventional. The reaction by his Australian counterparts D.M. Armstrong and Peter Forrest was that Lewis was not being ontologically serious. This chapter evaluates this debate over serious ontology. It is argued that in one sense Lewis is ontologically serious, but that his additional commitment to structuralism about classes (...) should push him to adopt a trope-theoretic account of naturalness, which opens up another way to respond to the charge of not doing serious ontology. This conclusion is supported by certain remarks he makes in his correspondence, thus revealing how his thinking about properties appears to have evolved from property-egalitarianism to a sparse theory of tropes. (shrink)

A problem for Aristotelian realist accounts of universals (neither Platonist nor nominalist) is the status of those universals that happen not to be realised in the physical (or any other) world. They perhaps include uninstantiated shades of blue and huge infinite cardinals. Should they be altogether excluded (as in D.M. Armstrong's theory of universals) or accorded some sort of reality? Surely truths about ratios are true even of ratios that are too big to be instantiated - what is the (...) truthmaker of such truths? It is argued that Aristotelianism can answer the question, but only a semi-Platonist form of it. (shrink)

This paper explores the logical consequences of the the thesis that all of the essential properties of consciousness can be known introspectively (Completeness, called "Strong Transparency" in the paper, following D.M. Armstrong's older terminology). It is argued that it can be known introspectively that consciousness does not have complete access to its essential properties; and it is show how this undermines conceivability arguments for dualism.

Our thesis is that proprioception is not a sixth sense distinct from the sense of touch, but a part of that tactile (or haptic) sense. The tactile sense is defined as the sense whose direct intentional objects are macroscopic mechanical properties. We first argue (against D. Armstrong, 1962; B. O'Shaughnessy 1989, 1995, 1998 and M. Martin, 1992, 1993,1995) that the two following claims are incompatible : (i) proprioception is a sense distinct from touch; (ii) touch is a bipolar modality, (...) that intrinsically has both a subjective-bodily pole and objective pole. We then argue that the bipolarity of touch should be preferred over the introduction of a sui generis sense of the body. We try to revive Aristotle suggestion according to which the body is the tactile medium (like the air for sight). Since this medium is constantly changing its shape, we need some specific channel of information about its state : proprioception, functionally defined, is that part of touch which informs us about the state of this changing tactile medium. Though muscular and articular receptors are usually dedicated to inform us about the mechanical properties of the tactile media, and the skin receptors about the mechanical properties of the tactile objects, this is not essentially so. In weighting or wielding experiments we access the weight of external objects even when skin sensitivity is absent; in prosthetic touch, the skin receptors play the role usually assigned to muscle and articular receptors, namely to inform us about the mechanical state of the tactile medium. So proprioception, anatomically defined, can play both the role of informing us about the tactile medium, or about the tactile objects. That other sensory modalities also rely on proprioceptive information should be understood in terms of cross-modal dependencies: of sight, hearing, smell, taste...on touch. (shrink)

Emphasizing the human body in all of its forms, Beauty Unlimited expands the boundaries of what is meant by beauty both geographically and aesthetically. Peg Zeglin Brand and an international group of contributors interrogate the body and the meaning of physical beauty in this multidisciplinary volume. This striking and provocative book explores the history of bodily beautification; the physicality of socially or culturally determined choices of beautification; the interplay of gender, race, class, age, sexuality, and ethnicity within and on the (...) body; and the aesthetic meaning of the concept of beauty in an increasingly globalized world. Foreward by Carolyn Korsmeyer. Authors include Noel Carroll, Gregory Velazco Y Trianosky, Monique Roelofs, Whitney Davis, Eleanor Heartney, Diana Tietjens Meyers, Phoebe M. Farris, Mary Devereaux, Jo Ellen Jacobs, Karina L. Cespedes-Cortes and Paul C. Taylor, Fedwa Malti-Douglas, Stephen Davies, Jane Duran, Valerie Sullivan Fuchs, Keith Lehrer, Allen Douglas, Cynthia Freeland, Eva Kit Wah Man, Mary Bittner Wiseman, and Peg Brand's essay, "ORLAN Revisited: Disembodied Virtual Hybrid Beauty.". (shrink)

RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE OS BEZERROS NATIMORTOS EM VACAS Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim [email protected] ou [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 15. NATIMORTOS Por natimortos, entende-se todos aqueles produtos (bezerros/bezerras) que nascem vivos após um tempo de gestação fisiológica normal, mas que morrem nas primeiras 24 horas de vida, ou às vezes nascem mortos, sem evidência clara de que a morte tenha ocorrido 48 horas (ou menos) antes do parto (FRAZER, 2005; GORDON, 1996). (...) Essa evidência, provém das mudanças autolíticas que o produto expelido apresenta. A causa que origina os natimortos é difícil de diagnosticar pela complexa e abundante presença de situações que poderiam levar à apresentação deste quadro. Entre essa complexa explicação etiológica, de origem nutricional podemos enumerar: 15.1 Nitratos e nitritos Um excesso de nitrogênio, seja não proteico ou originado da metabolização proteica excessiva, pode gerar natimortos, uma vez que os nitratos do alimento convertem-se no rúmen em nitritos e depois em amônio, que é excretado ou degradado de diferentes formas. Sob certas condições ambientais, como geadas, secas, granizo, etc. o metabolismo de algumas plantas como a cevada, aveia, milho, pastos e forragens de rápido crescimento não funciona normalmente, e os nitratos acumulam-se nas folhas e no caule; quando estes nitratos são consumidos pelo animal, alteram-se os processos metabólicos e ao haver excesso de nitritos e nitratos, há uma acumulação dos mesmos na corrente sanguínea, algo prejudicial. Os nitritos ligam-se à hemoglobina e geram a metahemoglobina, o que reduz a capacidade condutora do oxigênio no sangue, dificultando a chegada do mesmo ao feto, levando à óbito o produto em formação (DUPCHAK, 2005). Os sinais na vaca gestante geralmente são ofegantes, respiração rápida, tremores musculares, pulso fraco e acelerado, fraqueza, que termina com a queda do animal e convulsões terminais. Também se sabe que os nitratos têm um efeito vasodilatador, o que origina uma diminuição da pressão sanguínea, em todo caso a morte possui origem na acumulação de metahemoglobina. As vacas afetadas por esse excesso de nitratos desenvolvem incoordenação e dificuldades na capacidade respiratória que vão seguidas por colapso e morte. O sinal mais claro é que o sangue fica escuro. Sob condições de hipoxia o feto pode morrer ao ser iniciado o trabalho de parto, evento fisiológico de alto consumo de oxigênio pela contração muscular marcada necessária para conseguir a expulsão do produto. O estudo desses compostos podem não parecer importantes na vida corriqueira e laboral do campo, porém quando se aparecem problemas de difícil diagnóstico e tratamento, faz-se necessário um aprofundamento de toda a cadeia alimentar ou de ingestão dos animais, alimentos, bebidas, locais de descanso e dormida etc. Pois bem, o presente comentário norteia o assunto sobre os nitratos e nitritos que nada mais são do que compostos não proteicos e que em sua composição possuem nitrogênio e oxigênio, nitrato NO3- e nitrito NO2-. Diante da fermentação ruminal, o alimento rico em NO3- é reduzido pelo rúmen e se transforma em NO2- um composto altamente tóxico que, após absorvido na corrente sanguínea, causa anóxia por morte celular, sendo prejudicial tanto para o bovino adulto, quanto jovem e ainda mais para o feto em desenvolvimento. A ingestão excessiva desses compostos por meio da água ou das forragens podem ocasionar intoxicações. As forragens podem acumular nitrogênio através da fertilização do solo ou da planta com compostos ricos em N, são exemplos de plantas que acumulam bastante nitrato a Braquiária radicans e todas as plantas do gênero Amaranthus spp., para que se diminua o teor de nitratos presentes na forragem o mais indicado é o processo de ensilagem. Ainda relacionada a alimentação, vale ressaltar para o produtor rural que altos teores de nitrato ou nitrito no corpo animal ocasiona a deficiência da vitamina A que é essencial para o mecanismo fisiológico e metabólico do animal. As tabelas 1 e 2 trazem as concentrações ou os níveis ideais e máximos de nitrato presente nas forragens e na água, e se os teores expressos são recomendáveis ou não para a administração aos animais. Vale notar que os nitratos são compostos que se apresentam juntamente com o potássio K, o sódio Na e o próprio nitrogênio N na forma de nitrato e nitrito presente na água ou na matéria seca dos alimentos. Tabela 1: Concentrações de nitrato e recomendações quando apresentados na forma de nitrato de potássio KNO, nitrato de sódio NaNO, e N em forma de nitrato e nitrito na MS dos alimentos Forma de nitrato reportado Recomendações NO3-N NO3- KNO3- NaNO3- —————— 0 – 0,15% 0 – 0,65% 0 – 1% 0 – 0,9% Seguro para os ruminantes, pode utilizar 0,15 – 0,45% 0,65 – 2% 1 – 3% 0,9 – 2,7% Misturar com outros alimentos, compondo no máximo 50% da mistura > 0,45% > 2% > 3% > 2,7% Aumenta o nível de intoxicação, o mais indicado é não usar Fonte: BERCHIELLI et al., 2006. Tabela 2: Concentrações de NO3- e recomendações sobre os níveis de nitrato presente na água para bovinos Conteúdo de NO3- ppm Conteúdo de NO3-N ppm Recomendação 0 - 44 10 Pode utilizar 45 - 132 10 - 20 É seguro se o alimento tiver pouco nitrato e uma dieta balanceada 133 - 220 20 - 46 Prejudicial se for usada por muito tempo 220 – 660 40 – 100 Pode haver perdas e é um risco para vacas leiteiras 660 – 800 100 – 200 Aumenta a possibilidade de perdas, não é indicado usar > 800 > 200 Não utilizar Fonte: TEIXEIRA, 1997. Todas essas informações podem não parecer importantes para a prática no campo, porém em situações de problemas relacionados a altos índices de fetos que nascem mortos tais tabelas podem ser de extrema importância e salvar vidas. No caso de intoxicações, o indicado é o tratamento por azul de metileno a 1% sob dosagem de 4 – 14 mg/kg de peso vivo do animal. Todos esses manejos podem salvar o feto, o que faz com que o mesmo nasça vivo e torne-se um animal produtivo para a propriedade. 15.2 Minerais A deficiência de cobre, também tem sido apontada como uma das possíveis causas de origem de natimortos, uma vez que o cobre está ligado à albumina no sangue e no fígado está ligado à aminoácidos. Sua deficiência gera anemia já que o mesmo está envolvido no metabolismo do ferro, necessário para a formação da hemoglobina. Na deficiência, muda-se a cor da pelagem e da pele devido a necessidade do cobre no mecanismo de síntese da polifenil oxidase, que transforma a tironina em melanina; a escassez altera também a enzima lisil oxidase, necessária na formação das cadeias polipeptídicas de colágeno, por onde surgem os problemas ósseos e articulares (DE ROSA & MATIOLLI, 2002). Altera-se também a atividade do citocromo oxidase que está envolvido na síntese dos fosfolipídios, que formam a camada de mielina necessária para a transmissão nervosa e a resposta motora, causando ataxia e problemas de necrose graves que ocasionam a morte do feto. Além disso, as concentrações de dopamina e noradrenalina são alteradas, afetando o endotélio vascular, resultando adicionalmente em problemas cardiovasculares com graves crises hemolíticas que também causam a morte do produto. Geralmente, diz-se que a soma de todos estes problemas conformam os fatores desencadeadores de morte súbita do feto. Quando há uma deficiência nutricional de cobre, o animal começa a usar seus depósitos hepáticos, se os depósitos se esgotam, evidencia-se uma diminuição nos níveis sanguíneos e aparece a hipocupremia e hipocuprose; depois dos sinais acima mencionados, ocorre a degeneração progressiva do miocárdio, o que também contribui para a morte súbita do feto. O excesso de molibdênio gera uma deficiência de cobre e este também está inter-relacionado com o zinco. Para que não haja dominância de um e deficiência de outro sempre deve-se frisar as quantidades exigidas dos minerais pelos bovinos. O Cu é um elemento essencial e sua disponibilidade deve ser de 10 – 18 mg/kg de MS. O Mo deve ser fornecido em quantidades que não ultrapassem os 15 – 20 mg/kg de MS, a relação entre o Cu e o Mo não deve ser superior que 20, um excesso de Mo causa deficiência de Cu induzida. Por fim, o Zn deve ser fornecido em quantidades que não ultrapassem os 21 – 73 mg/kg de MS. 15.3 Vitaminas A vitamina A é necessária para manter a integridade dos epitélios digestivo, respiratório, genito-urinário e ocular, além disso é fundamental para o desenvolvimento ósseo já que controla a atividade dos osteoclastos e osteoblastos, também assegura a manutenção da permeabilidade das membranas celulares e da pressão do líquido cefalorraquidiano, portanto a sua deficiência provoca queratinização dos tecidos epiteliais, problemas gastrointestinais, o que acaba complicando-se com a invasão de germes e doenças infecciosas. Sua escassez ou falta também ocasionam malformações ósseas e problemas nervosos como ataxia e falhas na contratilidade do miométrio, o que, por fim, resulta na morte do vitelo. Na avitaminose A, as células epiteliais são achatadas e apresentam menor resistência à infecção, pode-se dar que todos os canais glandulares se bloqueiem causando atrofia glandular e morte do bezerro por não poder realizar suas funções fisiológicas. Os betacarotenos das forragens são as fontes mais importantes de vitamina A. A vitamina A deve estar intrinsecamente presente na dieta dos animais em quantidades de 50.000 – 125.000 UI/dia. 15.4 fito-toxicidade O excesso de fitoestrogênios produzidos por leguminosas como o trevo vermelho, trevo subterrâneo, feijão de soja, etc., que possuem estrogênios vegetais semelhantes aos 17β-estradiol que interagem com os receptores nucleares desta hormona e influenciam sobre os seus processos endócrinos. Ocorre estrogenismo que gera infertilidade, já que se limita a liberação de LH e no animal gestante aumenta a contractilidade uterina gerando abortos ou natimortos. Entre os fitoestrógenos estão as isoflavonas, que sofrem algum tipo de transformação no rúmen, onde o Isoflavonoide formononetina se converte em equol enquanto as demais se degradam a produtos inativos. A progesterona é a hormona responsável por manter as condições ideais para a gestação, aumentando-se os níveis de estrogênios ocorrerá a inibição da progesterona e apresentam-se condições adversas para o desenvolvimento e/ou vida do feto. Para se livrar desse problema o mais indicado é a utilização de forragens que além de suprir as necessidades nutricionais dos animais sejam de boa qualidade e utilizadas o mais fresco possível. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS BARRENHO, Gonçalo José Pinheiro. Nutrição e fertilidade em bovinos de leite. 2016. Dissertação de Mestrado. Universidade de Évora. BERCHIELLI, Telma Teresinha; PIRES, Alexandre Vaz; OLIVEIRA, SG de. Nutrição de ruminantes. Jaboticabal: funep, 2006. BINDARI, Yugal Raj et al. Effects of nutrition on reproduction-A review. Adv. Appl. Sci. Res, v. 4, n. 1, p. 421-429, 2013. BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. DEHNING, R. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad. In: Curso Manejo de la Fertilidad Bovina18-23 May 1987Medellín (Colombia). CICADEP, Bogotá (Colombia) Universidad de La Salle, Medellín (Colombia) Instituto Colombiano Agropecurio, Bogotá (Colombia) Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Técnica-GTZ (Alemania), 1987. DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. ROSA, Diana E.; MATTIOLI, Guillermo Alberto. Metabolismo y deficiencia de cobre en los bovinos. Analecta Veterinaria, v. 22, 2002. DIAS, Juliano Cesar et al. Alguns aspectos da interação nutrição-reprodução em bovinos: energia, proteína, minerais e vitaminas. PUBVET, v. 4, p. Art. 738-743, 2010. DUPCHAK, K. Nitratos en Forrajes para Vacas Lecheras. Engormix 2005. Disponível em. Acesso em: Abril de 2020. FRAZER, Grant S. Bovine theriogenology. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 21, n. 2, p. xiii-xiv, 2005. GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. MAAS, John. Relationship between nutrition and reproduction in beef cattle. The Veterinary Clinics of North America. Food Animal Practice, v. 3, n. 3, p. 633-646, 1987. PASA, Camila. Relação reprodução animal e os minerais. Biodiversidade, v. 9, n. 1, 2011. SARTORI, Roberto; GUARDIEIRO, Monique Mendes. Fatores nutricionais associados à reprodução da fêmea bovina. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 39, p. 422-432, 2010. SHORT, Robert E.; ADAMS, D. C. Nutritional and hormonal interrelationships in beef cattle reproduction. Canadian Journal of Animal Science, v. 68, n. 1, p. 29-39, 1988. TEIXEIRA, J. C.; TEIXEIRA, LFAC. Alimentação de bovinos leiteiros. FAEPE, Lavras, 1997. (shrink)

This paper argues that, by construing emotion as epistemologically subversive, the Western tradition has tended to obscure the vital role of emotion in the construction of knowledge. The paper begins with an account of emotion that stresses its active, voluntary, and socially constructed aspects, and indicates how emotion is involved in evaluation and observation. It then moves on to show how the myth of dispassionate investigation has functioned historically to undermine the epistemic authority of women as well as other social (...) groups associated culturally with emotion. Finally, the paper sketches some ways in which the emotions of underclass groups, especially women, may contribute to the development of a critical social theory. (shrink)

Is capitalism inherently predatory? Must there be winners and losers? Is public interest outdated and free-riding rational? Is consumer choice the same as self-determination? Must bargainers abandon the no-harm principle? Prisoners of Reason recalls that classical liberal capitalism exalted the no-harm principle. Although imperfect and exclusionary, modern liberalism recognized individual human dignity alongside individuals' responsibility to respect others. Neoliberalism, by contrast, views life as ceaseless struggle. Agents vie for scarce resources in antagonistic competition in which every individual seeks dominance. This (...) political theory is codified in non-cooperative game theory; the neoliberal citizen and consumer is the strategic rational actor. Rational choice justifies ends irrespective of means. Money becomes the medium of all value. Solidarity and good will are invalidated. Relationships are conducted on a quid pro quo basis. However, agents can freely opt out of this cynical race to the bottom by embracing a more expansive range of coherent action. (shrink)

Two attitudes are possible: one, that the world is an absolute jungle and that the exercise of coercive power by rulers is only a manifestation of this; and the other, that it is both necessary and right that there should be this exercise of power, that through it the world is much less of a jungle than it could possibly be without it, so that one should in principle be glad of the existence of such power, and only take exception (...) to its unjust exercise. (shrink)

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the (...) bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

"Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight" is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, "since surrender" or "it follows that surrender or fight", and (3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (...) ("surrender or fight" permits you to fight without surrendering, but "surrender" does not), so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing one's mind and thus cannot be construed as making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of 'inference', some everyday-life inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions does not amount to changing one's mind. (shrink)

(Penultimate Draft). I consider common ground in its evolutionary context and argue for several claims. First, common ground is widely (though not universally) distributed among social animals. Second, the use of common ground is favored (i.e. is predicted to emerge and subsequently persist) among populations of animals whose members face recurrent interdependent decision-making problems in which the benefit of their courses of action are contingent on the variable choices of their stable social partner(s). Third, humans deploy cognitive and social mechanisms (...) for establishing and updating common ground that are not deployed by other living animals—the use of common ground has not only persisted within the human lineage but been amplified as well. Finally, I suggest that some of these points count against the iterative construal of common ground. In its place, I propose an alternative psychological construal of common ground in terms of what I will call reciprocal responsiveness. (shrink)

Kadri Vihvelin, in "What time travelers cannot do" (Philos Stud 81: 315-330, 1996), argued that "no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self, because (V1) "if someone would fail to do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it", and (V2) if a time traveler tried to kill her baby self, she would always fail. Theodore Sider (Philos Stud 110: 115-138, 2002) criticized Vihvelin's argument, and Ira (...) Kiourti (Philos Stud 139: 343-352, 2008) criticized both Vihvelin's argument and Sider's critique. I present a critique of Vihvelin's argument different from both Sider's and Kiourti's critiques: I argue in a novel way that both V1 and V2 are false. Since Vihvelin's argument might be understood as providing a challenge to the possibility of time travel, if my critique succeeds then time travel survives such a challenge unscathed. (shrink)

In “Flourish,” Martin Seligman maintained that the elements of well-being consist of “PERMA: positive emotion, engagement, relationships, meaning, and accomplishment.” Although the question of what constitutes human flourishing or psychological well-being has remained a topic of continued debate among scholars, it has recently been argued in the literature that a paradigmatic or prototypical case of human psychological well-being would largely manifest most or all of the aforementioned PERMA factors. Further, in “A Neuroscientific Perspective on Music Therapy,” Stefan Koelsch also suggested (...) that “Music therapy can have effects that improve the psychological and physiological health of individuals,” so it seems plausible that engaging in practices of music can positively contribute to one living a more optimally flourishing life with greater psychological well-being. However, recent studies on music practice and participation have not yet been reviewed and integrated under the PERMA framework from positive psychology to further explore and explicate this possibility. This article therefore contributes to extant work by reviewing recent research on psychological well-being and music to offer support for the claim that music practice and participation can positively contribute to one living a flourishing life by positively influencing their emotions, engagement, relationships, meaning, and accomplishment. (shrink)

I argue that Evolutionary Psychologists’ notion of adaptationism is closest to what Peter Godfrey-Smith (2001) calls explanatory adaptationism and as a result, is not a good organizing principle for research in the biology of human behavior. I also argue that adopting an alternate notion of adaptationism presents much more explanatory resources to the biology of human behavior. I proceed by introducing Evolutionary Psychology and giving some examples of alternative approaches to the biological explanation of human behavior. Next I characterize adaptation (...) and explain the range of biological phenomena that can count as adaptations. I go onto introduce the range of adaptationist views that have been distinguished by philosophers of biology and lay out explanatory adaptationism in detail. (shrink)

Coreferentialism refers to the common assumption in the literature that slurs and descriptors are coreferential expressions with precisely the same extension. For instance, Vallee recently writes that “If S is an ethnic slur in language L, then there is a non-derogatory expression G in L such that G and S have the same extension”. The non-derogatory expression G is commonly considered the nonpejorative correlate of the slur expression S and it is widely thought that every S has a coreferring G (...) that possesses precisely the same extension. Yet here I argue against this widespread assumption by first briefly introducing what slurs are and then considering four sources of supporting evidence showing that slurs and descriptors are in fact not coreferential expressions with precisely the same extension. I argue that since slurs and descriptors differ in their extension they thereby differ in their meaning or content also. This article additionally introduces the notion of a conceptual anchor in order to adequately account for the relationship between slurs and descriptors actually evidenced in the empirical data, and further considers the inadequacy of common dictionary definitions of slurs. This article therefore contributes to the literature on slurs by demonstrating that previous accounts operating on the assumption that slurs and descriptors are coreferential expressions with the same extension, and that they thereby have the same meaning or content, are inconsistent with empirical data and that an alternative account in accord with Croom better fits the facts concerning their actual meaning and use. (shrink)

Hume's Treatise arguments concerning space, time, and geometry, especially ones involving his denial of infinite divisibility; have suffered harsh criticism. I show that in the section "Of the ideas of space and time," Hume gives important characterizations of his skeptical approach, in some respects Pyrrhonian, that will be developed in the rest of the Treatise. When that approach is better understood, the force of Hume's arguments can be appreciated, and the influential criticisms of them can be seen to miss the (...) mark. (shrink)

A consensus exists among contemporary philosophers of biology about the history of their field. According to the received view, mainstream philosophy of science in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s focused on physics and general epistemology, neglecting analyses of the 'special sciences', including biology. The subdiscipline of philosophy of biology emerged (and could only have emerged) after the decline of logical positivism in the 1960s and 70s. In this article, I present bibliometric data from four major philosophy of science journals (Erkenntnis, (...) Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science), covering 1930-59, which challenge this view. (shrink)

Hubert Dreyfus has argued that cases of absorbed bodily coping show that there is no room for self-awareness in flow experiences of experts. In this paper, I argue against Dreyfus’ maxim of vanishing self-awareness by suggesting that awareness of agency is present in expert bodily action. First, I discuss the phenomenon of absorbed bodily coping by discussing flow experiences involved in expert bodily action: merging into the flow; immersion in the flow; emergence out of flow. I argue against the claim (...) that flow experience does not involve an awareness of agency for each of these features, while conceding that fluent agency does not involve self-awareness in the thetic sense. I challenge the assumption that the awareness of fluent agency must be understood in terms of a thetic awareness of agency. Instead, I develop an Anscombean account of the awareness of fluent agency in terms of the phenomenal character of knowing one’s aims. I respond to the challenge that if an Anscombean account of the awareness of agency is to succeed, then agents must be able to answer Anscombean questions. I consider the objection that awareness of agency is not a form of self-awareness by outlining an account of self-awareness as self-synthesis that is distinct from self-perception and self-ascription, but which makes room for self-awareness in expert bodily action. (shrink)